




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# WRSP-2



ILLEGIB



# OPERATION

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
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I. GENERAL SUMMARY

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6 - 10 MAY 1959

I. GENERAL:

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A. MISSION OBJECTIVES: The requirements for [ ] were outlined in Headquarters Operations Orders 4-59 and 5-59 and encompassed three objectives:

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1. Exercise the "Fast Move" concept (see Detachment 10-10 Operations Plan 42-59 dated 1 April 1959).
2. Ferry aircraft 351 to the ZI.
3. Obtain weather data to further substantiate M. E. W. weather story.

B. STAGING:

1. Preparations: The mobility gear as outlined in Operations Plan 42-59 had been prefabricated and maintained on alert readiness since 15 April 1959. This entailed placing all gear on rollers or within weight limitations so as to permit the entire kit to be moved by hand. This was in line with the assumption that no outside support, forklift, etc., would be available.

2. Pre-Deployment: The support aircraft, a C-130, arrived 5 May 1959. The total time of 26 minutes was required to load all equipment aboard the C-130. This included moving the gear from the hangar and into place on the C-130.

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4. Staging Area: A site for setting up the mobile gear was selected away from the main base on a hardstand 300 yards from the end of the runway [ ]. All staging personnel participated in the unloading and erection of the hangar and communications site. Total unloading and setting-up time was three hours. Again no outside support was utilized. Fuel barrels for the first mission were in place near the hardstand upon arrival. (See photographs, Tab III.) All electrical power, compressed air, purging nitrogen, oxygen and auxiliary equipment fuel (80 octane and kerosene) were carried in the staging kit. Heaters, commodes, food, sleeping bags, blankets are all included in this package. At no time was the kit supplemented by base support or assistance. Equipment fabricated by the unit worked extremely well. This included the compact communication facility, portable hangar, a compressed air fuel pumping system and many other

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time, space and weight saving devices. (For a run-down on the U-2 operations [ ] see Tab IV, B-1).

C. CONCLUSIONS: The time table and planning factors as established for the "Fast Move" concept are definitely realistic and very workable. This manner of operation offers all the assets of the heretofore long stagings without compromising reliability. In addition, security is increased a thousand fold since the unit is self-contained and requires no base assistance and only limited liaison with Air Traffic Control to launch and retrieve the aircraft. Any type of operation can be staged and launched under this concept, including weather [ ]

Communications can be established and can support this type operation.

[ ] will successfully operate when actuated after takeoff from pre-strike base.

The C-130 aircraft is the most suitable aircraft for this type operation. This is from the standpoint of reliability, speed, and configuration (loading and unloading).

D. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. All future stagings be conducted along lines outlined in Detachment 10-10 Operations Plan 42-59.

2. Continued effort be placed on developing more sophisticated mobile gear, weight, cube and mobility wise.

3. Operation's [ ] reports should be dispatched at briefed times to avoid the confusion caused by misinterpreting delays as a communication's breakdown. A dispatch on the brief time indicating a delay would clear up this problem.

E. COMMENTS:

1. It is interesting to note that the total time for this operation was 88 $\frac{1}{2}$  hours. Excluding the second weather mission and ferry requirement, the total elapsed time would have been less than 52 $\frac{1}{2}$  hours, Adana to staging base and return. The distances, as mentioned above, are the same as those involving [ ] and TOUCHDOWN.

2. The use of the hangar and teletype facilities in the hangar complicated the problem by introducing two locations

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for operation. In the actual staging, communications, billeting, etc., would be at the C-130 location.

3. Recommendations made by each section in Tab IV that can be corrected or remedied locally were not included in paragraph I, sub para D.

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II - TIMETABLE

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III - PICTORIAL ILLUSTRATIONS

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Figure 1

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(110 volt power), communications gear,  
tent poles, maintenance kit.




Figure 2

Commodore and opposite side of Figure 1

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TAB III, page 1

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Figure 1

Communications, maintenance, transmitter, air start rollaway--note casters

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


Figure 2

Left: Communications rollaway containing 3 receivers, emergency low-power (100 watt) transmitter, tool kits, and materials necessary for circuit operation. When emptied, is used as operating table. Right: 400 watt transmitter. (Plywood skin to be used in place of packing material.)

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Figure 1

Portable hangar and fuel barrels in position prior to arrival of U-2. Note communications tent and antennas in background. Set-up time for hangar and communications (operating): 3 hours.




Figure 2

Hangar and fuel barrels.

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


Figure 1

U-2 in position—total ground time, 4 hours




Figure 2

MA2 compressed air used to pressurize fuel barrel. Refueling to full load—45 minutes

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IV - INDIVIDUAL SECTION COMMENTS

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B-1. OPERATIONS

1. COMMENTS

a. 6 May 59: With the arrival of the [ ] at 0614Z, Operation [ ] was underway. The C-130, support aircraft, containing staging gear and personnel departed as scheduled at 0800Z [ ] arriving at 1815Z [ ] Immediately after landing at the advanced base, personnel cleared customs and then assisted in unloading the equipment from the support aircraft. Following the unloading, operations personnel proceeded to hangar #2 to check the facilities and contact detachment communications. Liaison with Air Traffic Control was established and procedures outlined whereby they would be advised whenever operations required their service in regards to aircraft arrivals and departures. This was to be conducted on a daily basis.

b. 7 May 59: Mission 312 (weather) was launched and retrieved on schedule with one minor exception. Air Traffic Control [ ] was late in turning on the UHF equipment, thus preventing aircraft radio checks until just prior to takeoff. With the arrival of BF 59-5 (ferry) operations was moved from the confines of the C-130 to hangar #2 and this facility utilized for the remainder of the staging period.

c. 8 May 59: One flap developed during flight planning for mission 313, the [ ] did not arrive until one hour and forty two minutes prior to scheduled launch time. Fortunately, the pilot had seen the mission the previous day and was familiar with the route, this permitted operations to complete the celestial pre-comps based on latest winds as celestial was the primary aid to navigation. BF 59-5 [ ] was launched as scheduled at 0900Z. At 1315Z, notice was received through Air Traffic Control that mission 313 had diverted to [ ] due to a hydraulic failure. A pickup team departed immediately [ ] and arrived one hour and thirty minutes after notification. Aircraft 349 landed at [ ] with Colonel Beerli as pilot.

d. 9 May 59: BF 59-4 was launched at 1102Z. The Operations Section completed its portion of the staging exercise at this time and prepared for departure to home base. The C-130 departed [ ] at 1421Z and arrived [ ] at 0030Z, 10 May.

2. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Operation [ ] proved that the "fast move" concept is a very effective method of operations.

b. The original concept of flight planning on the flight deck of the C-130 was proven impractical due to its small confines and can best be utilized as an isolated sleeping area for the pilot with flight planning conducted in the cargo compartment.

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3. RECOMMENDATIONS

That all reports required by the Reports Control Manual be dispatched on time to avoid any confusion as to whether there could be a possible communications breakdown. If there is to be a delay in transmission of a report, a note to this effect can be included in a  message at the regular scheduled time.

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B-2. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT SECTION

1. The operation from the C-130 worked out well. The Personal Equipment box was opened in the aircraft and necessary equipment unloaded and set up in the forward section. A cot and mattress was used for pre-breathing with the seatpack tester, oxygen cylinder and battery cart at one end of the cot. A curtain was hung across the aircraft to partition off the pre-breathing section from the activity at the rear of the airplane. There were no problems encountered in pre-breathing the pilot, dressing him, transporting him to the U-2 or in hookup. The pilot continued breathing from the walk-around bottles until the aircraft was towed into position on the taxiway near the runway turn-off. Three full cylinders are sufficient for this from the initial hookup until the aircraft is parked in position.

2. There were no difficulties in operating from the hangar area. Facilities are adequate with the exception of the outdoor latrine which will require extra precautions during cold or rainy weather. A portable heater is needed in the latrine during the winter months.

3. Recommendations:

a. A 28 volt battery or battery cart always be available for the seatpack tester.

b. Better lighting be installed in the pre-breathing section of the C-130.

c. A portable latrine be used or water for cleaning the C-130 latrine bucket be made available.

d. Four mattresses be carried with P. E. instead of two.

e. One headset be available for P. E. only. Another should be used for mobile.

f. At least three full walk-around bottles be carried along for use from hookup until facepieces are changed on the taxiway.

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B-3. WEATHER SECTION

1. Weather equipment performance was nearly as expected prior to departure. Condition prior to departure was as follows:

- a. Turbulence channel inoperative.
- b. Ground speed and drift angle channels inoperative due to lack of Radan.
- c. Altitude channel inoperative.
- d. Dew point channel inoperative.

2. Equipment was installed at Adana and was not removed from the aircraft until return to Adana.

3. One additional malfunction was encountered during Operation [redacted] One pitot pressure line and one static line were inoperative. This caused the airspeed channel of the AJH recorder system to be inoperative and some doubtful data on the VGH, BB, and VG recorders. These defects were discovered upon return to Adana.

4. During Operation [redacted] maintenance information and schematic diagrams were presented to the weather technician. It is believed this information should alleviate the turbulence and altitude malfunction. If this information had arrived at Adana prior to Operation [redacted] the above channels might have been operative. Information was received that a complete Radan system is enroute to Adana and should alleviate Radan troubles.

5. SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS:

a. Suggest utilization of Weather Package #2 during Operation [redacted] be classified as "research and testing exercise for new weather equipment."

b. On future mission, the Radan be in operation, this being the principle component of the package. Without Radan there can be no wind computations. Weather-wise, had Operation [redacted] been delayed until Radan was in commission, the exercise would have been more successful.

6. COMMENTS ON FACILITIES:

a. As always in the case of a staging exercise, there is constantly a great amount of noise and activity in the vicinity of the aircraft. An orderly allotment of time and duties could prove profitable.

b. A rectifier would alleviate the noise caused by the operation of the MA-2 in the hangar. There are [redacted]

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only at junction boxes and is not connected to receptacles. A [redacted] could easily be installed in various sections of the hangar. Overhead lighting is poor. 50% of these fixtures were not used because proper switches could not be located.

c. Housing and messing facilities for sergeants were good. Due to the present billeting of [redacted] at the sergeants mess, there is one suggestion: that civilian clothing be authorized to alleviate the carrying of additional class "A" uniforms and fatigues. Civilian clothing is always carried for off-duty purposes and will avoid any suspicion or questions.

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C-1. MATERIEL

1. The cargo deployed aboard C-130 aircraft in compliance with Operations Order 4-59 was as outlined in Operations Plan 42-59 Annex B, Appendices 1 and 2 with several exceptions. Cargo weight was 19,255 pounds and cube was 1986.6 cubic feet. Difference in actual weights versus cargo recap in appendix 6, Annex B for Pre-Post Strike Team was addition of Number 1 and 2 weather package in place of Special Equipment. To prove mobility of cargo deployed, no mechanical assistance (i.e., fork-lift) was used in loading C-130 at home base that would not be available at deployment base.
2. Exceptions to Operations Plan 42-59 were deletion of Special Equipment and addition of Weather Package Nr. 1, plus hatch and dollies to accommodate this package if it were used.
3. Although very few items were required from the Flyaway Kit deployed, no changes in the kit are contemplated. The kit, as packed, was quite hard to move about. The kit has now been repacked in standard metal flyaway bin and will be deployed in this bin on future deployments.
4. Equipment deployed was adequate and no noticeable shortages affecting the mission were observed. Maintenance equipment is now in process of being repacked, to improve accessibility at deployment base.
5. No problems were encountered in manifesting cargo. Pre-prepared packing lists were complete and accurate manifests were quickly prepared from these lists.

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C-2. MAINTENANCE

1. Operation [ ] began for the Maintenance Section on 5 May with the arrival of the C-130. The C-130 was in position and ready to load at 1405Z, at 1431Z the aircraft was completely loaded. The twenty six minutes it required to load proved the adaptability of the pre-packaged kits.

2. The C-130 departed with all hands at 0800Z 6 May 59 and after an uneventful trip with a fuel stop [ ] we arrived at the forward staging site at 1815Z. After clearing customs we immediately started to unload the C-130. We started at 1835Z and finished at 1855Z for an even twenty minutes. We were billeted, then had dinner and upon our return, started to set up the gear. At the end of three hours the U-2 tent was up, the fuel barrels were in place for fueling the U-2 and all necessary equipment was unpacked and laid out so as to be ready for immediate access. We then retired for the night.

3. Aircraft 349 arrived on 7 May at 0615Z. We put it into the tent we had set up the night before and started right in fueling the aircraft. The fueling operation took a total of 45 minutes. This operation was performed in such a short time due to special air pumps which were manufactured locally at home base. The rest of the pre-flight took another hour. The checking out of the Weather Package took one hour more. This made the aircraft completely checked out and ready to go with a full hour to spare. Aircraft was launched on time.

4. Aircraft 351 landed at 1255Z, 7 May, with no squawks and was put into the hangar. It was fueled and pre-flighted in one hour and a half after landing.

5. We then picked up aircraft 349 and put it in the hangar. At the de-briefing, the pilot stated there were no squawks. We started a pre-flight for the next day's mission and completed it in two hours. No maintenance problems were found with the aircraft.

6. On 8 May, we launched aircraft 349 (weather) at 0800Z and aircraft 351 (ferry) at 0900Z. Aircraft 349 experienced a loss of hydro pressure (which induced a flameout) and also a stuck fuel counter. The pilot landed the aircraft at another base. We set out as soon as possible in a local aircraft taking just the items we thought we would need. Upon arrival and after a thorough investigation, we decided the failure of a tail gear line had caused the hydro failure. We capped off the tail gear system, fueled the aircraft with JP-4, and it was ferried back to the forward staging base by the Commander. The whole operation took three hours.

7. 9 May. At the forward staging base, it was decided to ferry 349 back home with the tail gear down. We made two engine runs and could detect no sign of any leakage in the hydro system. The aircraft departed at 1102Z. We later found out the aircraft had another hydro failure on the way home. Investigation of aircraft 349 revealed hydro failure due to split in SP-H-57-14 Hydro Tank. We then loaded the C-130 and departed for home base at 1421Z and arrived at 0030Z 10 May.

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8. Recommendations:

- a. A pressure regulator be installed in T fitting of air line to barrel pump.
- b. At least one motor-scooter be brought along for transportation.

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C-3. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

1. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS:

a. When the alert for this mission was received a staff meeting was called in which the purpose of the mission, times of departure, loading of the plane, etc., were announced. Problems were discussed and solutions were presented. As only the tracker cameras were to be used, Operations Order 42-59 was modified to eliminate all "B" equipment and supplies. Only test equipment and supply for four tracker missions were included and as this was in place and ready under plan 42-59 all that had to be added was a stock of film. The shipping documents were re-made before the complete staging shipment was ready to move. The following equipment and supplies were taken by [ ] the tracker technician.

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Power cart with 28V DC and 115V AC, vacuum pump, cables and hoses	290 lbs	18 cube
Spare tracker camera in shipping case	100 "	8 "
Supply box containing film, 5 each, dark cloth, hand tools, cleaning kit, and spare parts	115 "	4 "
Hatch dolly	140 "	44 "

25X1

A 4" X 5" ground camera was taken by [ ] to photograph the staging operation as a record for this report. Nitrogen gas for purging the tracker and driftsight was in place on the MA-2 truck.

b. Loading the C-130 transport aircraft was accomplished as per schedule with all special equipment material being easily loaded.

25X1

c. Unloading the C-130 at the staging base went smoothly. [ ] assisted in positioning boxes and in erecting the tent. The power cart and all the tracker supplies were assembled inside the C-130. The 115V AC was supplied by an OANAN generator outside the aircraft. The generator's throttle had to be adjusted before the generator put out full power. There was ample room inside the C-130 to set up all the tracker equipment and no difficulties were encountered.

d. On the morning of the 7th, the tracker for Mission 312 was pre-flighted, loaded with film, and power checked. At 0900 the tracker was installed in the weather hatch and operated with A/C power. The equipment checked out satisfactorily and the hatch was installed. The driftsight and hand control were checked and the driftsight was purged until the canopy was sealed. After the aircraft was launched the C-130 tent and all equipment was moved to the hangar. Aircraft 349 was placed in the hangar upon completion of the mission and the tracker was post-flighted in the aircraft. The weather hatch was removed and the tracker taken out and unloaded. It was a 100% mission with 725 feet of film being exposed.

e. The tracker for Mission 313 was pre-flighted and loaded

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the night of the 7th and as there was no 115V AC in the hangar it was not power checked until the aircraft was ready for loading. By 0800 of the 8th, the tracker had been power checked and the hatch was in place. The driftsight and hand control were checked and purging began. On return of the aircraft, the weather hatch was not dropped and the tracker was post-flighted in the hatch. The power check showed that the tracker was operating properly and approximately 410 feet of film had been used. The tracker was left in the aircraft to be used on the return flight to the home base.

f. All the equipment was loaded aboard the C-130 for the return to the home base and no difficulties were encountered.

## 2. CONCLUSIONS:

The careful planning and pre-selection of equipment made for a very smooth operation. There were enough supplies and spares to correct any foreseeable malfunctions. Several minor points for improvement were noted and will be incorporated into the mobility plan that will make future operations better. The time schedule for setting up and loading are more than enough to accomplish the mission. It is felt by this section that the staging was a complete success.

## 3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. When operations were moved to the hangar 115V AC power should have been available to operate the power cart so the pre and post flight inspections can be made. It is important that these checks be made, especially in the case of the pre-flight check. If power is not available for these checks they must be delayed until aircraft power can be used and a malfunction discovered at this time could delay the launching.

b. A small nitrogen bottle will be added to the power cart so that the tracker can be purged without having to carry it to the MA-2 truck.

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D. COMMUNICATIONS

1. General: The "Fast Move" communications equipment, as outlined in para 5, Appendix 2, was employed in [ ] This was to prove the feasibility of the following assumptions :

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a. Reliable C-W communications could be established between base and pre or post strike positions within six hours after landing of the support aircraft.

b. A team of three communicators, (CT/R), could, with some additional non-technical help, set up equipment, shelter, and erect the necessary antennas.

c. Base monitoring of clear channel frequencies would provide interference free channels for both field and base.

d. Packaging of equipment into roll-away units would insure greater mobility, allow faster set-up time, and reduce weight and cube.

2. Discussion:

a. The communications equipment was set-up and considered operationally ready in a total time of two hours and 50 minutes. This was done in darkness, which added approximately half an hour to the actual set-up time, as compared to previous tests.

b. Base started its scheduled transmission at 2300Z, 6 May and continued the scheduled transmissions until 0130Z, 7 May. In all cases, the transmissions were successfully monitored at the field site, with better than average readability reports.

c. One base transmission was made at 1100Z, 7 May, with a readability report of "perfectly readable."

3. Conclusions:

a. Reliable communications between post or pre-strike positions and base can be established in six hours after the support aircraft lands.

b. No more than three communications (CT/R) are required for the pre and/or post strike positions.

c. Frequencies selected by base monitoring are valid for both base and field.

d. The roll-away units allowed a maximum of set-up efficiency with a minimum of effort.

4. Recommendations:

a. The communications equipment should include a vertical flood-light for illumination purposes. This will facilitate the erection of masts under nighttime conditions.

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b. The HT-4 (400 watt transmitter) have a skin cover fabricated. This is for in-flight protection.

c. Caster tracks be fabricated so that the roll-away can be transported over rough or muddy terrain.

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E. SECURITY

1. GENERAL COMMENTS:

a. One security agent was deployed with the advance party and arrived at the staging base on 4 May 1959. This agent conducted a preliminary survey and established liaison.

b. The main security force arrived at 1815Z 6 May 1959 via support aircraft. Perimeter security was provided for the support C-130 and its cargo. Assistance was given in unloading the C-130, erecting the canvas hangar, commo tent and other equipment. At approximately 0000Z, work stopped and perimeter security was provided throughout the night.

c. On 7 May 1959, the first mission was launched and retrieved without incident. Normal security was provided during the operation. The canvas hangar was disassembled and the entire operation was moved into [ ] which has been partitioned off for this type operation. During daylight hours [ ] provided external perimeter security and a security agent internal security. During the night hours [ ] with sentry dog patrolled the exterior and a security agent maintained internal security.

d. The hangar was of concrete and steel construction with no windows on the ground level on the main hangar deck. One side of the hangar had four rooms which were used as commo, operations, pre-breathing and special equipment. All windows and doors in these rooms could be adequately secured and screened.

e. On 8 May 1959, the second mission and the ferry flight launched without incident. About one hour prior to down time word was received that aircraft 349 had suffered a hydraulic failure and was force landed [ ]

[ ] A party including the security officer was dispatched in a [ ] and arrived about one hour and 30 minutes after the aircraft had landed. It was parked in a remote area of the field and only the "driver" and an air policeman were in attendance. After about one and one half hours ground time, temporary repairs were made and the aircraft was flown back to base by the Detachment Commander. There is no reason to believe that this incident will compromise the mission.

f. On 9 May 1959, repairs were made on aircraft 349 and it was launched for [ ] at 1100Z. The C-130 support aircraft was loaded and departed with the main body at 1421Z, arriving at [ ] at 0030Z on 10 May 1959.

2. CONCLUSIONS:

Security was adequate in all respects. A total of four security personnel were used on this staging and this is considered the minimum number to be used. Two of this number should be special agents and two special employees. The hangar and surrounding area provide good security for conducting an operation of this type.

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3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. It is recommended that:

(1) All message traffic be classified including that regarding movement of support aircraft.

(2) A detachment uniformed Air Force Officer of the rank of Major or above be in attendance when support aircraft crews are briefed.

(3) Non-detachment but Project cleared personnel who accompany such stagings be more careful in their conversations particularly around support aircraft crews, etc. Topics such as camera capability, range, sponsorship, etc., should be avoided. Such personnel should also be briefed that work spaces and living quarters have not been cleared

(4) It is also recommended that inflight rations and a large thermos of coffee be carried on the support aircraft on the next staging.

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F. MEDICAL

1. General Considerations

- a. Medical facilities at staging base were good. Base sick quarters equipped with bed accommodation. Two hospitals available within thirty miles. Minimal amount of medical kit was carried, e.g., one flight surgeon's kit.
- b. Hygiene and sanitary conditions at the staging base were good. No health problems encountered due to location of this base.
- c. Messing facilities were good. Schedule of mess meals differed from our working hours at times, however, the mess staff cooperated to put on meals to suit our requirements. Snacks and beverages were available from a mobile canteen. Transportation was provided between working area and the mess.
- d. Sleeping accommodations. Individual rooms were provided in the mess (club). The pilots slept in the mess before missions.
- e. Comfort of the pilot during pre-breathing and prior to hook-up. Pre-breathing took place on a cot; this was satisfactory, though use of a local made head rest would be of value. The cot was positioned in the forward part of the C-130 cargo hold and the area curtained off with a blanket to provide some isolation. No problem with heat or cold due to temperate climate and the weather held good.
- f. Aircraft noise. Personal prophylaxis during flight with waxed cotton ear plugs which were adequate.

2. Conclusions:

A staging operation to such a base at this time of year causes no medical problems.

3. Recommendations:

- a. Lack of medical facilities would entail carrying enough medical equipment to supply emergency supportive treatment.
- b. Hygiene and sanitary conditions. It would be advisable to brief all staging personnel on the local conditions when these are going to be unhealthy.
- c. The aim is to have the pilot hooked up into his aircraft well rested, fed, comfortable and having suffered the minimum of mental and physical trauma during the staging flight. Factors that might help achieve this:

(1) Eight hours sleep to be aimed at.

(2) Ear defenders for noise exclusion.

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(3) Pilot to sleep in a cot, preferably between sheets, in an isolated part of the aircraft.

(4) Until the problem of in-flight feeding and drinking is solved, the pre-flight meal is of great importance; individual tastes could be catered for if the meal is prepared at home base and carried in vacuum flasks.

(5) Pre-breathing the pilot on the C-130 flight deck is an excellent scheme. Being a small area, it can be heated in cold weather, and an electric fan should be installed to cool the pilot, unless he wears an air ventilated suit; however, use of the latter would mean carrying enough air cylinders to last through the pre-breathing period.

(6) Latrine bucket will have to be available on the flight deck, whether the C-130 crew like it or not.

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